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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, many international organizations have become
victims of what is often referred to as politicization. Politicization
was one of the reasons for the temporary withdrawal of the United
States from the International Labor Organization ("ILO") between
1977 and 1980,1 and for its withdrawal from the United Nations
Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") in
1984.2 Likewise, the more recent United Nations World
* Vice Dean, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Israel; Visiting Professor,
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I have benefited from the comments and
suggestions of Tomer Broude, Jeffrey Dunoff, Marcia Harpaz, Moshe Hirsch,
Robert Keohane, and Yaffa Zilbershatz. I am also indebted to several trade
officials with whom I had helpful discussions, in particular Marcel Shaton, John
C.C. Deng, Edwini Kwame Kessie, Gabriela Wurcel, and Joseph Ackerman.
Thanks to Jeff Reynolds for his research assistance. Needless to say, the opinions,
errors, and omissions contained herein are entirely mine.
1 See generally Background on U.S. Reentry into ILO, 80 DEP'T ST. BULL. 65, 65-66
(1980) (detailing reasons for the American decision to withdraw from the
International Labor Organization ("ILO") and subsequently rejoin the
organization); Letter from Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, to Mr.
Francis Blanchard, Director General of the ILO (Nov. 5, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1582 (1975) (expressing the intent of the United States to withdraw from the ILO).
Kissinger's communication reiterated four complaints. Firstly, the United States
deplored the erosion of tripartite representation caused by government
encroachment on the independence of workers and employers. Secondly, the
United States deplored the use by the International Labor Conference of double
standards in matters of human rights, particularly with regard to trade union
freedom and forced labor; the selective condemnation or exemption of certain
groups of member states by virtue of their political systems undermined ILO
credibility as well as respect for human rights. Thirdly, and most importantly, the
United States denounced resolutions condemning particular member states on the
basis of political criteria without due process of law and in flagrant disregard of
established ILO procedures for examining complaints alleging violation of trade
union freedoms. Finally, the United States categorically condemned the growing
politicization which had caused the ILO to divert its attention from its social
mandate and to become increasingly involved in matters more properly within
the competence of the United Nations ("UN"). Id. at 1583-84.
2 See Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, to His Excellency
Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, Director General, United Nations Educational, Scientific
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Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa in 2001,
which was meant to be "a landmark in the struggle to eradicate all
forms of racism,"3 was hijacked by a prevailing majority of
undemocratic states that turned it into a political weapon of racism
and bigotry antithetical to the human rights protection that it was
meant to promote.4  Even a trade-oriented international
organization such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") has been tainted by severe
politicization that is generally seen as having frustrated
UNCTAD's ability to achieve most of its objectives.
In contrast to these and other international governmental
organizations ("IGOs"), the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
as well as its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), seems to have managed to keep relatively free
from the plague of politicization. It is a business-minded
organization fully devoted to its mandate of multilateral trade
liberalization and of developing an "integrated, more viable and
durable multilateral trading system."5 Unlike many other so-called
and Cultural Organization (Dec. 28, 1983), in 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 41 (February 1984)
(notifying the Director-General of the American decision to withdraw from the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")
because of the government's concern over "trends in the management, policy and
budget of UNESCO").
3 The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance: Basic Information, http://www.un.org/WCAR/e-
kit/backgrounderl.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
4 See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky, The UN World Conference Against Racism: A Racist
Anti-Racism Conference, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65 (2002) (arguing that the
treatment of Israel during the World Conference Against Racism was an example
of what the Conference was meant to prevent). Bayefsky further writes:
Success on the political battlefield was to be accomplished by using the
language of human rights to demonize and then dismember the
opponent. Human rights served as a weapon to wrongly characterize
the "plight of the Palestinian people" as one of racial persecution, to fan
the flames of anti-Semitism, and ultimately to provoke irrational
passions that undermine both the cause of peace and of human dignity.
Id. at 72. See generally Irwin Cotler, Durban's Troubling Legacy One Year Later:
Twisting the Cause of International Human Rights Against the Jewish People,
JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF, Aug. 20, 2002, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief2-5.htm
(asserting that the Conference became a "conference of racism against Israel and the
Jewish people"); Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider's View of the UN World
Conference Against Racism, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2002, at 31, 32
(2002) (discussing the hopes and goals of the conference in its planning stages).
5 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
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specialized agencies of the United Nations ("UN") which often
have turned into battlegrounds of major political conflicts, both
regional and transcontinental (East-West), often only remotely
related to the mandate of the organization, the GATT and the WTO
have hitherto largely managed to keep away from such conflicts
and prevent them from infiltrating their internal discourse. This is
not to say that the GATT and the WTO have been free from
politics. As in every organization involving states -which are, by
definition, political entities -politics is always involved, in the
sense of diverging socio-economic policies and ideologies and the
use of political tactics in order to further what is perceived as the
national interests of the various member states. However, the
politics practiced within the GATT and the WTO is trade politics,
as opposed to "higher" geopolitical politics that is unrelated, at
least in a direct and meaningful way, to trade policy. Thus, even
states involved in severe political conflicts, with no formal
diplomatic connections, can find themselves cooperating within
the WTO in order to further common commercial interests.
This Article seeks to understand the reasons for the
unpoliticized nature of the GATT and the WTO, and more
generally what it is that makes one international framework more
attractive to the influence of politics than others. It will seek to
determine the special characteristics of the WTO that have
managed to keep it clear from that type of politics and will ask
whether, based on those special characteristics, there is a risk that
this may change in the future. The threat to the WTO in this
regard stems from the broadened mandate of the organization, the
recurring attempts from certain directions to introduce politically
controversial concepts into the WTO discourse, the change in the
public profile of the WTO, the subordination of trade policy to
foreign policy, and the growing membership of the organization
Indeed, lately there have been a few worrying signs of
politicization within the WTO that have had a negative impact on
its ability to function and fulfill its mandate.6
1994, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Preamble
(1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6 See infra text accompanying notes 82-93, describing the existing situation
whereby: no international governmental organization ("IGO") is being granted
observer status within the World Trade Organization ("WTO") as a result of
retaliation measures by Egypt and other Arab states in protest against the United
States' refusal to grant observer status to the Arab League; no WTO address and
telephone directory could be published for a long time because of a political
2005]
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The issue of politicization of functional IGOs is a relatively
unexplored topic. 7 Given the importance of effective IGOs to a
well-functioning world order and the detrimental effect
politicization has had on the ability of many of the IGOs to fulfill
their missions, this is a vitally important topic. This Article begins
to fill in a gap in the literature in this regard -in relation to IGOs,
in general, and relating to the GATT/WTO, in particular-with the
hope of spurring further research in this field.
The discussion will proceed as follows: Section 2 will discuss
the politicization phenomenon in international organizations in
general, and within its theoretical setting of functionalism in
particular, and will thus develop the definition of politicization
that will be used in this paper. It will also show how politicization
has infiltrated some of the major UN specialized agencies,
including those with a pure economic mandate, and has severely
harmed those agencies' ability to fulfill their mandates. Section 3
will then expound on the relative absence of politicization within
the GATT during its half-century existence and will discuss some
of the instances in which the GATT was confronted with political
conflicts and how it dealt with them. Section 4 will try to reveal
the reasons for this absence of politicization within the GATT by
contrasting it to other IGOs that were plagued by politicization.
Based on the conclusions of the previous section, in Section 5 1 will
try to assess the risk that the WTO will be politicized in the future,
the sources of this risk, and the worrisome signs of politicization
that have already emerged.
2. THE POLITICIZATION PHENOMENON IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Politicization has had a destructive effect on many
international organizations, in particular the UN's specialized
agencies. These organizations were meant to serve various
nonpolitical goals, in fields such as health, culture, education, and
trade, but often find themselves hijacked into highly controversial
and political conflicts that frustrate their ability to fulfill their
dispute between China and Taiwan; Taiwan's accession to the Agreement on
Government Procurement is blocked because of the same political dispute; and
the United States has linked WTO membership for Iran to changes in Iran's
nuclear policy.
7 Most of the existing literature is referred to in the coming footnotes, in
particular infra note 9.
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mandates. In the seventies and the eighties, many of these
organizations were almost paralyzed insofar as their original
mandates were concerned, to the extent that, in 1982, the Secretary-
General of the UN himself recognized the serious crisis that the
multilateral approach to international relations was experiencing
and the related erosion of the authority and prestige of
international institutions.8
While one can find several different definitions of politicization
in the scant literature on the subject, 9 the notion can best be
understood when it is related to the theory of functionalism.
Functionalism is one of the most central theories of international
organizations, which motivated many of the founders of the UN's
specialized agencies.10 It holds that a world community can best be
achieved by the creation of nonpolitical international agencies
dealing with specific economic, social, technical, or humanitarian
functions." Functionalists argued that it was unrealistic to expect
governments to agree to give up substantial authority to
international organizations in areas that involve their vital political
8 The Secretary-General at the time was Javier Perez de Cu~llar. See generally
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, 1982, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/37/1 (Sept. 7,
1982) (expressing his anxiety over the inability of the United Nations and its
various organs to serve their purpose and to play an effective role in the
international conflicts of the time); Robert W. Cox, The Crisis of World Order and the
Problem of International Organization in the 1980s, 35 INT'L J. 370 (1980) (describing
the crisis of international organizations and the powerlessness of the UN and its
specialized agencies in the face of this crisis); UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN THE MINDS OF MEN: UNESCO AND INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION INTO THE 21ST CENTURY (1989)
http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=358 9 77 (arguing that
UNESCO politicization "manifested itself in the system-wide 'crisis of
multilateralism' that by the mid-1980s seemed to place the UN itself in jeopardy").
9 See, e.g., BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF
THE WORLD BANK 13-30 (1992) (discussing the various definitions of
"politicization" in an international context); Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Politicisation
of UN Specialised Agencies: A Preliminary Analysis, 14 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD.
317, 321-25 (1985); Gene M. Lyons, David A. Baldwin & Donald W. McNemar, The
"Politicization" Issue in the UN Specialized Agencies, in THE CHANGING UNITED
NATIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 81, 81 (David A. Kay ed., 1977) (defining
"politicization" from the American political perspective).
10 See, e.g., Eckart Klein, United Nations Specialized Agencies, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 349, 366 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1983) (stating that
"[t]he conceptual basis of the Specialized Agencies is functionalism").
11 The founder of Functionalism is considered to be David Mitrany. Hans J.
Morgenthau, Introduction to DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 7, 11
(1966).
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and security interests. However, in order to perform nonpolitical
functions, such as airline routing, river navigation, and weather
forecasting- functions that serve their citizens but need to be
carried out beyond national borders - governments can, and ought
to, engage in cooperative arrangements with other governments.12
Only after states have developed habits of effective international
cooperation concerning such less controversial matters, will a
process of ramification occur-that is, a gradual expansion of the
areas of cooperation into areas of high-level political concerns. The
functionalist premise served not only as the theoretical
underpinning of the specialized UN agencies at the time of their
founding, but also of the European Economic Community ("EEC").
The EEC, which has since evolved into the European Union with
newly obtained powers in the field of foreign policy and security,
appears to have successfully followed the path set out by the
functionalists.
Be that as it may, functionalism clearly assumes that economic,
social, and technical matters can be separated from politics. 13
Indeed, the success of the specialized agencies and other IGOs in
dealing with such matters is conditioned upon such separation.
Their proper functioning is often based on a delicate consensus
between their members on what both the mandate and spheres of
activity of the organizations should be. Once this consensus is
broken by one or more member states, other member states are
bound to feel free to break it themselves in the pursuit of each
state's particular political interests. Politicization therefore implies
serious dysfunction of the IGO, which will impair the IGO's entire
operation. Thus, politicization, for the sake of this paper, refers to
a situation where actions are taken for purposes unrelated or
inadequately related to the goals and functions of that IGO, but
rather stem from the geopolitical goals and strategies of a
particular member state or group of member states.14 While it is
12 Lyons et al., supra note 9, at 83.
14 Other schools of thought in the field of international relations, such as
Realism and Marxism, are more skeptical about the possibility of separating
politics from economic, social, and technical matters, and, consequently, are also
skeptical of the analytical usefulness of the notion of politicization. See, e.g., id.
(questioning the analytical usefulness of the concept of politicization, while at the
same time recognizing its political impact).
14 Thus, by basing our definition on the stated goals and functions of the
organization, as specified in its charter, we overcome the claims made by some
commentators that political and nonpolitical goals cannot be differentiated, since
784 [Vol. 26:4
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true that some IGO mandates are rather vague and member states
often disagree about the precise scope of an IGO's objectives, the
fact that there may be disagreement between the members of the
organization about how broadly or narrowly its mandate and
objectives should be interpreted does not negate the criterion
itself. Law is abundant with abstract and vague definitions that
are the subject of diverse interpretations, but are nevertheless
helpful and workable in most cases (for example, the legal concept
of "reasonableness"). As will be discussed below, the GATT/WTO
mandate is relatively precise and limited when compared to the
mandates of some other IGOs. We will also see that the
GATT/WTO practice itself confirms that the contracting parties
distinguish between economic and political goals, and view the
former as within the mandate of the GATT/WTO and the latter as
outside it.15 Of course, an organization may decide to broaden its
mandate and add new fields and objectives to its terms of
reference, as was done, for instance, by the WTO in relation to
environmental protection.' 6 If all its members agree upon this, the
everything a state does is political. See id. (recognizing that agency programs are
established via political intergovernmental agreements, and therefore are
intrinsically intertwined with political issues); see also David A. Baldwin,
Prologamena to Thinking about Economic Sanctions and Free Trade, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L.
271, 271 (2003) ("The practice of differentiating between 'political' and 'non-
political' economic sanctions requires a criterion for distinguishing between
political and non-political goals .... Unless such a criterion can be found, the
distinction between 'political' and 'nonpolitical' motives (goals, purposes, or
ends) is untenable."). My response to Baldwin is that a criterion can be found, at
least when speaking about the activities of and within an IGO: the criterion is the
mandate of the IGO. Where actions are taken for purposes either unrelated or
inadequately related to this mandate, but rather stem from geopolitical goals and
strategies of a certain member state or group of member states, then it is a political
action which tends to politicize the IGO. This criterion makes the distinction
reasonably clear and workable, in particular for lawyers who are accustomed to
examining the scope and limits of legal authority. See BROWN, supra note 9, at 27,
87-100 (advocating a similar approach to this argument, particularly as it applies
to voting powers).
15 See, e.g., Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, L/5424 (Nov. 29, 1982),
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 11 (1982) [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration of
1982] (where the contracting parties undertake to abstain from taking restrictive
trade measures for reasons of a noneconomic character, thus in essence
recognizing the distinction between economic and political policies and that only
the former are legitimate within the system). See also examples quoted infra
regarding the accession of Egypt, the statements of the Japanese and U.S.
representatives in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT')
discussion of the Falkland/Malvinas dispute, and the U.S.-Poland and U.S.-
Nicaragua disputes.
16 See infra Section 3.
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definition of politicization will change accordingly. Consequently,
in principle, the notion of politicization does not prevent the
introduction of noneconomic considerations into the discourse of
an IGO devoted to economic or trade matters, provided these
considerations fall inside its mandate and further its objectives.
Victor-Yves Ghebali has identified six types of dysfunctions
that amount to politicization.17 One type is dysfunction through
"extraneity," where politicization derives from the systematic
insertion of extraneous issues into agendas, debates, and work
programs. As an example, he cites the "intrusion of the Middle
East question into the debates of virtually all the [UN specialized]
agencies since 1973."18 Another example is the disarmament issue,
which was usually raised by the Soviet bloc countries within the
work programs of organizations such as UNESCO, the ILO, and
the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.19
Both cases identified by Ghebali constitute a serious
impairment of the workings of the UN specialized agencies. On
the one hand, the specialized agencies are obliged to spend a
disproportionate amount of time and effort on sensitive political
issues, which more correctly fall within the mandate of the United
Nations, at the expense of their own well-defined activities. On the
other hand, as exemplified by the disarmament issue, this
overloading of work programs produces over-lapping and
considerable duplication of effort, and intensifies (rather than
resolves) the controversy. 20
This dysfunction is closely related to another dysfunction,
which Ghebali calls "hyper-confrontation." 21  In this type of
dysfunction, politicization leads to changes in the rules of the
parliamentary diplomacy game. On the one hand, constructive
17 Ghebali, supra note 9, at 322. In addition to extraneity, hyper-
confrontation, and excommunication, which I describe in the text above, Ghebali
identifies the following three types of politicization dysfunctions: the erosion of
the liberal principles embodied in the charters of the IGOs, which serves to
undermine the constitutional purposes and functions of these charters;
"nomomania," meant to describe the abusive practice of forcing through
resolutions of one-side normative content that contribute nothing to solving the
problem at hand; and administrative mismanagement and budgetary excesses. Id.
18 Id.
19 See The American Protest in the Framework of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, DAILY BULLETIN (U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the United
Nations In Geneva, Geneva, Switz.), Mat. 29, 1984, at 1.
20 Ghebali, supra note 9, at 322.
21 Id. at 323.
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debates are losing ground to polemics and ill-disguised
propaganda. On the other hand, outright confrontation tends to
prevail over any spirit of compromise within the decisionmaking
process. In organizations where this process is based on majority
voting, the result will be the imposition of resolutions that are
unacceptable to the minority, whose viewpoints are, in some
instances, totally ignored.22 In organizations such as the WTO,
where decisions are made by consensus, the result of the choice of
confrontation over compromise may be complete paralysis.
Another type of dysfunction, identified by Ghebali, takes the
form of condemnation and excommunication. 23  He rightly
maintains that condemnation and near-expulsion of member states
through resolutions enacted by the voting majority constitute the
most disturbing aspect of politicization. These measures are
always applied to certain states (but never to others) that are
singled out by this majority in accordance with a somewhat double
standard. The condemnatory resolutions so frequently adopted by
the specialized agencies display a rather summary conception of
justice: they call certain members to account for political
considerations without due process of law, while the majority
serves as prosecution, judge, and jury. This type of politicization
has been found even within IGOs devoted to purely economic
goals, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"). The "Group of 77," which
incorporated all the developing countries within the UNCTAD,
controlled the organization for decades and managed to pass
scores of extremist resolutions with its automatic majority
resolutions. Although these resolutions perhaps served their
political goals, they did little to contribute to the welfare of the
developing states that such resolutions were supposed to serve.
The Group also excommunicated Turkey and Israel from their
scores, notwithstanding the fact that, at the time, these states
22 Id. Ghebali cites two examples to illustrate this situation. The first is a
resolution by the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. See G.A. Res.
37/92, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982) (laying out the principles
governing the utilization by states of earth satellites for the purpose of direct
broadcasting). The second example is a decision by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") in November 1983 on a
system of South-South preferences whereby Turkey and Israel were excluded
from the system, by a vote dominated by the Group of 77. Id.
23 Id. at 324.
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undoubtedly met the criteria for developing countries. 24 Many of
the Group of 77 delegates would walk out of the room whenever
an Israeli delegate spoke, and would automatically vote down any
proposal submitted by such a delegate, irrespective of its merits.
25
3. THE ABSENCE OF POLITICIZATION WITHIN THE GATT/WTO
Turning now to the GATT/WTO system, it was established as
an organization devoted to reciprocal trade liberalization. In order
to further the goals of "raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and
exchange of goods," the 1947 GATT created the framework for
"reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and
to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce." 26 In the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO,
concluded in 1994, the wording was changed from "full use" to
"optimal use of the world's resources," and the objectives of
"sustainable development" and "preserving the environment"
were added.27 Thus, actions taken and decisions made in trade
matters for the sake of environmental protection are today within
the mandate of the organization. Otherwise, the goals remained
the same, with the agreement repeating the previous goal of
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.
Thus, based on our above definition, politicization would be
found to occur if we determine that actions within the
GATT/WTO organs were taken for purposes that are unrelated or
inadequately related to the goals and functions of the organization,
24 MICHAEL ROM, BENETIV HAMEDINIUT HAMISCHARIT HABEINLEUMIT SHEL
YISRAEL: HA'ADIFUYOT VEHASHUK HA'EROPEI HAMESHUTAF [IN THE PATH OF ISRAEL'S
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICY: GSP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET]
166, 173, 222 (1998). The author, Dr. Michael Rom, served as Israel's delegate to
UNCTAD, and the book includes his own detailed accounts of his experience in
the organization.
25 Id. at 145-46. Rom describes how at first the Sudanese delegate voted in
favor of an Israeli proposal in relation to the functions of an International Center
of Trade, but when informed by his Arab colleagues that Israel was the initiator of
this proposal he withdrew his vote and gave it to another proposal put forward
by the Swedish delegation. Id. at 146.
26 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
27 WTO Agreement pmbl., para. 1.
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but rather are aimed to achieve geopolitical goals and strategies of
a certain member state or group of member states. This has
usually not been the case within the GATT/WTO, at least not until
recently, and if there have been such occurrences, they have been
relatively rare and insignificant.
Some of the instances in which the GATT was confronted with
political conflicts and how it dealt with them are recounted below.
3.1. The Accession of Egypt
An illustrative -and perhaps constitutive -episode in this
regard is the story of the accession of Egypt (or the United Arab
Republic, as it was called at the time) to the GATT in the early
sixties.28 The request to accede was submitted in April 1962 and
was greeted with much enthusiasm by most members, who were
interested in broadening the ranks of the GATT with a large and
important developing country such as Egypt. Israel, who had
become a permanent member shortly before, asked to be part of
the Working Party commissioned to examine the request. When
the Egyptians discovered this, they were beside themselves. At the
time, Egypt, under Jamal Nasser, saw itself as the leader of the
Arab world and stood at the forefront of the campaign to impose
political isolation and economic boycott on Israel and on anyone
trading with her. Egypt threatened that if Israel remained a
member of its "admission committee" it would withdraw its
request to accede. However, Israel had preempted Egypt by
declaring that "it was in favor of the accession of any country to
the GATT, provided it was willing to fulfill the obligations of the
agreement." 29  Moreover, the accepted rule was that any
contracting party who so requested had the right to participate in a
Working Party examining the accession of a new country. Despite
the heavy political pressure to withdraw from the Working Party
28 This episode is described and documented in detail in my article in
Hebrew on the history of Israel's participation in the GATT. Arie Reich,
Hahistoriah shel Hishtatfut Medinat Yisrael BeGATT Ube'irgun Hasachar Ha'olami [The
History of Israel's Participation in the GATTIWTO], in IRGUN HASACHAR HA'OLAMI
VEYISRAEL: MISHPAT, KALKALA VEPOLITIKA [THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND
ISRAEL: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS] (Arie Reich ed., forthcoming 2006).
29 Delegate of Israel, Statement to the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (Nov. 13, 1962) (GATF, Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting Held at the
Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, November 13, 1962, SR 20/9, at 135 (Nov. 26,
1962)).
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that was placed on the Israeli delegate by the GATT Secretary-
General, Eric Wyndham White, and by some of the more powerful
GATT members, Israel insisted on participating. In response to
these pressures, the Israeli delegate emphasized the fact that the
GATT was supposed to be a nonpolitical organization, and that
giving in to the Egyptian pressures would set a dangerous
precedent. In the course of the deliberations of the Working Party,
Israel did not oppose the accession of Egypt, but did, however,
point out the problematic aspects of Egypt's trade policy, which, in
Israel's opinion, needed to be changed prior to an accession. In
particular, Egypt's economic boycott of Israel and of any foreign
company trading with Israel was clearly in conflict with the
provisions of the GATT, as was its blocking of the Suez Canal to
certain vessels, which was in clear violation of Article V of GATT.30
In response, the Egyptian delegate insisted that this boycott was
imposed not for commercial reasons, but "as a result of a political
conflict which was not a matter to be discussed within GATT."31
At the end of the day, the Working Party voted in favor of
Egypt's accession. However, the fact that the Egyptian delegate
was forced to face the Israeli delegate, to talk to him and to answer
his questions, was unprecedented. More importantly, the Egyptian
assertion that the political conflict between the two countries was
not a matter to be discussed within the GATT set an even more
significant precedent and was actually followed in practice by
future Egyptian delegates to the GATT who also refrained from
trying to use the organization in their political battle against
Israel.32 Indeed, an Israeli diplomat who served in Geneva in the
30 "There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit
to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinction shall be made
which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or
destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels
or of other means of transportation." GATT art. V, para. 2.
31 GATT Working Party, Accession of the United Arab Republic, 12, L/1876
(Oct. 25, 1962).
32 This does not mean that one can agree with the Egyptian assertion that its
violations of the GATT were justified because of its political motivation.
Although there are scholars that argue for the existence of a general "foreign
policy exception," this is not the general view among most commentators. See
Eugene Kontorovitch, The Arab League Boycott and VVTO Accession: Can Foreign
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 283 (2003) (examining
whether GATT applies to trade restrictions imposed solely for foreign policy
purposes). The point made here is a different one: that Egypt accepted the notion
that the political conflict between Egypt and Israel should not be brought to the
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eighties told me that the same Egyptian and Pakistani diplomats
who would walk out on him whenever he would rise to speak in
the UNCTAD would do nothing of the sort across the street at the
GATT headquarters. 33 On the contrary, there they would willingly
cooperate with him in mutually advantageous initiatives.
34
3.2. The Falkland/AMalvinas Islands Conflict
Another incident that illustrates the resolve of the GATT
contracting parties to keep political conflict outside the
organization is connected to the Falklands crisis between
Argentina and the United Kingdom ("UK"). Following
Argentina's invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in April
1982, the EEC adopted a decision imposing trade sanctions on
Argentina, which was joined by Australia and Canada. Instead of
bringing the issue to the dispute settlement mechanism, Argentina
decided to bring it before the GATT Council. In a communication
circulated to all contracting parties, 35 and in its oral presentations
to the Council,36 Argentina claimed that the trade sanctions
violated fundamental provisions under the GATT (such as the
Most-Favored Nation ("MFN") obligation under Article I and the
ban on import restrictions under Article XI) and that the sanctions
were imposed for noneconomic reasons, namely, in order to exert
political pressure on Argentina. Argentina also pointed out that,
except for the UK, the sanctions had been imposed on the Malvinas
by contracting parties that were foreign to the political conflict
GATT and should not influence its work. This does not mean that GATT
contracting parties are precluded from asserting their legal rights under the
GATT, or from taking the available measures to enforce them through the dispute
settlement system and, if authorized, through suspension of benefits.
33 Marcel Shaton, who served as Israel's delegate to the GATT during the
years 1981-1986, recounted this story to me.
34 For instance, Mr. Shaton recalls active cooperation between the Pakistani
and Israeli delegations in order to further an initiative related to the Multi-Fiber
Agreement, which was in the interest of the two states. As another example,
Israel and several Arab countries also found themselves cooperating on several
fronts in the WTO Ministerial in Doha in order to further positions of mutual
economic interest. See Sapir Peretz, Veidat Irgun Hasachar Haolami: Sikuy Lesevev
Sichot Nosaf [The VVTO Conference: A Chance for Another Negotiating Round], GLOBES
(Isr.), Nov. 11, 2001, at 8 (noting that during the Ministerial in Doha, Katar, Israeli,
and Arab delegates were cooperating to further common interests).
35 Permanent Mission of Argentina to GATT, Trade Restrictions Affecting
Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, 1, L/5317 (Apr. 30, 1982).
36 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7
May 1982, 2, C/M/157 (June 22, 1982).
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with Argentina, and that Argentina had not been notified of the
measures taken. Finally, the Argentinean delegate tried to
characterize the situation as one of economic aggression of
developed countries against a developing country in violation of
the special rules that the developing countries were entitled to
enjoy under GATT and under other international conventions.
In their response, both in writing and orally before the Council,
the representatives of the European Community ("EC"), Australia,
and Canada argued that their measures were taken "on the basis of
their inherent rights, of which Article XXI ("Security Exceptions")
of the General Agreement was a reflection." 37 They also recalled
that the UN Security Council had passed Resolution 502 calling for
the withdrawal of Argentinean troops from the islands and the
immediate cessation of hostilities, and therefore their actions could
be seen as falling within either Article XXI(b)(3) or XXI(c). 38 In any
case, they stated this was not an issue of the relations between
developing and developed countries.39 Finally, they argued that
measures under Article XXI did not require any notification to
GATT or to the affected party.40 Many other delegations spoke at
the session,41 some supporting the Argentinean position and some
the EC position on the question of whether the trade sanctions
amounted to a violation of GATT obligations and whether this was
a North/South issue. However, almost all delegations expressed
their concern about the introduction of political conflicts into the
GATT discourse and how this could harm the GATT's ability to
serve its purpose. For instance, the statement of the Japanese
representative (who did not take a stance on the dispute itself) is
typical of this concern.
The representative of Japan, in expressing his
country's deep concern about this crisis, said that
GATT was an international organization
37 Commission of the European Communities, Australia, and Canada, Trade
Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons 1, L/5319 (May
5, 1982).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See, for instance, presentations by the European Community ("EC") and
Canada. Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 May 1982, supra
note 36, at 10-11.
41 Representatives of no less than twenty-eight country delegations spoke at
the session. See id.
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specializing in and dealing with economic matters
such as reducing and eliminating tariffs and other
trade barriers, through co-operation among the
contracting parties. In his view, the interjection of
political elements into GATT activities would not
facilitate the carrying out of its entrusted tasks. He
stressed that one of the most important contributing
factors for the effective and efficient functioning of
the GATT was that contracting parties had
developed a working habit of dealing with trade
affairs in a businesslike manner. It was therefore
important that contracting parties remind
themselves of the tradition of this pragmatic and
business like approach; and he expressed the wish
that based upon this tradition, the spirit of co-
operation would prevail in GATT.42
A similar concern was raised by the U.S. representative.
He stated that GATT could not resolve this
dispute or help the involved parties, and that
forcing the GATT, against its provisions and
traditions, to play a role that it was never intended
to play could seriously undermine its utility, benefit,
and promise for all contracting parties.43
Thus, almost all delegations were of the opinion that the
conflict between the UK and Argentina could not be solved within
the GATT, and expressed their hope that it would be resolved in a
more appropriate international forum. Under such conditions, it
was clear that the Council, working under the consensus principle,
would be unable to take any decision on the merits of the dispute,
not even on its trade aspects. While the Argentinean delegate had
suggested that the consensus rule should be abandoned in this
case,44 the Chairman of the Council, B.L. Das of India, ignored this
plea, and after summarizing the various opinions that had been
42 Id. at 9; see also id. at 5-7, 9-11 (reflecting similar opinions in statements
from Zaire, Cuba, India, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Australia).
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id. at 12.
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expressed in the discussion, opted for a neutral (and rather
meaningless) decision according to which "in the light of the
utmost importance of the subject and the keen interest which had
been shown in it, the matter should remain open and be kept on
the agenda of the Council." 45
The manner in which the GATT Council's Chairman
sidestepped the need to take any stance in this political
controversy is typical of how the GATT has worked over the years.
It is how the GATT has managed to keep out of controversy and
continued to fulfill its task of promoting trade liberalization and
successful cooperation among its members, regardless of any
political and military conflicts that erupted between them. Thus,
Argentina's attempt to obtain a resolution in its favor from the
GATT Council was doomed to fail. In the UNCTAD, in contrast,
Argentina would probably have fared better, considering the
automatic majority of the developing countries which clearly
would have come out against the "economic aggression" of the
previously colonial powers.46 However, a resolution in its favor
from UNCTAD would have had little value for Argentina and
done nothing to solve its economic problems.
Of course, Argentina could have tried to bring its claim to
formal dispute settlement within the GATT. Indeed, from a strictly
legal perspective, the defending claim of the EC, Australia, and
45 Id. at 13. This proposal was adopted by the Council. In June 1982, the EC
embargo was suspended. Argentina, nevertheless, continued to demand from the
Council a decision that would establish a general interpretation of Article XXI
reflecting its views. See generally GATT art. XXI (outlining security exceptions to
the treaty). After considerable debate, a much more limited decision was
adopted, merely requiring that contracting parties be notified to the fullest extent
possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI. Thus a legal rule regarding
the duty of notification was established by the Council, but not a ruling on the
merits of the politically sensitive controversy. See GATT Council, Decision
Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement: Decision of 30 November 1982,
L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D (29th Supp.) at 23 (1982) (discussing the rights
of contracting parties under Article XXI). See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM 502 (1993) (outlining the "Falklands War" embargo case between
Argentina and the EC, Canada, and Australia). The Ministerial Declaration
adopted at the thirty-eighth session of the Contracting Parties included a
provision whereby "the contracting parties undertake, individually and
jointly: ... to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a non-
economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement." Ministerial
Declaration of 1982, supra note 15, at 9, 11.
46 Id. This was the spirit of the presentations of most of the developing
countries in the GATT Council, particularly those from Latin America.
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Canada, according to which their trade sanctions were justified
under Article XXI of GATT, was quite weak. Except for the UK,
none of these countries could be considered as having taken
genuine measures "necessary for the protection of [their] essential
security interest."4 7 Nor did the Security Council's Resolution 502
mention any such trade sanctions,48 so they could not be
considered as acting "in the pursuance of [theiri obligations under
the UN Charter," as required by Article XXI(c). 49 While there are
scholars that argue for the existence of a general "foreign policy
exception," 50 this is not the view among most commentators,51 and
it is unlikely that such a claim would be accepted by a GATT Panel.
On the other hand, the language of Article XXI(b) appears to leave
it to each state to decide what it considers "necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests," and an argument
could also be made for a broader interpretation of Article XXI(c).
52
Be that as it may, under the pre-WTO system which required a
consensus decision within the GATT Council in order to launch a
dispute settlement procedure and in order to get a panel report
adopted,5 3 the prospects for Argentina were not very promising
either. This too was a political "safety valve" of the GATT that
prevented its dispute settlement mechanism from getting involved
47 GATT art. XXI(b).
48 See S.C. Res. 502, U.N. Doc. S/RES/502 (April 3, 1982) (demanding that the
governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom stop using force in the region
of the Falkland Islands).
49 GATT art. XXI(b). Since only the Security Council is capable of creating
obligations under the UN Charter, it is generally thought that this provision refers
to Security Council decisions requiring the imposition of trade sanctions on a
certain state. But see discussion infra note 73.
50 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 812 cmt. a (1987) (stating
that "[tihe GATT has regulated devices employed by states to gain economic
advantage for their products over the products of other states; it has been thought
to be inapplicable to trade practices to achieve noneconomic ends such as national
security or foreign policy purposes").
51 See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 273 (2d
ed. 2001) (stating that aside from non-application, there is no broad
"political" exception to the MFN obligation in the GATT-WTO regime that
could easily justify certain U.S. trade sanctions); Kontorovitch, supra note 32,
at 298-301 (analyzing the incompatibility of the foreign policy purpose exception
with WTO rules); Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, International Regulation and Control of
the Production and Use of Chemicals and Pesticides: Perspectives for a Convention, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 653, 693 (1992) (noting that there is no GATT mechanism that
allows restrictions for foreign policy reasons).
52 GATT art. XXI.
53 HUDEC, supra note 45, at 8-9, 166.
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in politically sensitive disputes. Indeed, the record shows that
there have been very few disputes over the security exception in
Article XXI.54
3.3. Other Political Conflicts Within the GATT
Following the Falkland/ Malvinas conflict, there were several
more instances in which trade sanctions that were imposed for
noneconomic reasons put pressure on the GATT system. These
include a U.S. withdrawal of MFN treatment in response to
Poland's treatment of the "Solidarity" movement in 1984, 5 and
U.S. trade sanctions and later total trade embargo in response to
Nicaragua's policies in Central America.5 6 In all three cases a
similar pattern emerges: any attempt by a contracting party to
obtain a decision in the GATT Council in its favor on the
substantive issue(s) in dispute failed,57 whereas formal dispute
54 See e.g., RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW 154-157 (1998) (outlining how
Article XXI has worked in practice). None of the few disputes relating to Article
XXI reached any substantive ruling on this provision, or on its application to the
case at hand. In the Nicaragua case of 1985, the United States blocked the
appointment of a panel until the question of the validity of the United States'
Article XXI invocation was excluded from the panel's terms of reference. Id.; see
also HUDEC, supra note 45, at 527 (detailing the effect of the U.S. embargo on trade
with Nicaragua).
55 For an account of this dispute, see HUDEC, supra note 45, at 507-08.
56 Id. at 202-03, 512-13, 527-28.
57 Poland attempted to obtain a decision by the Council "not accepting" the
United States' justification for the measure. In view of the disagreement of the
United States and other contracting parties, no decision was ever adopted in this
regard, even though the issue was raised several more times over the next two
years. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
2 November 1982, at 4-12, C/M/162 (Nov. 19, 1982) (considering the United States'
proposed unilateral suspension of Poland's most-favored-nation status); see, e.g.,
GATT Council, Summary Record of the Second Meeting Held at the International
Labour Office, on Tuesday, 27 November 1984, at 10 a.m., at 7-9, SR.40/2 (Jan. 9, 1985)
(noting in point 14 the failure of the United States to comply with GATT
recommendations and dispute settlement procedures). Poland never requested
adjudication by a panel. Likewise, in the second dispute with the United States,
Nicaragua proposed a Council decision disapproving the U.S. embargo, to no
avail. See GATT Council, United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua: Draft
Decision Submitted by Nicaragua, C/W/475 (May 31, 1985) (deciding to disapprove
unilateral trade embargoes and urge the two governments to initiate dispute
settlement); GATE Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 10 October 1985, at 5-6, C/M/192 (Oct. 24, 1985) (agreeing to establish a panel
to examine Nicaragua's complaint against the United States); GATT Council,
Minutes of Meeting Held in Centre William Rappard on 12 March 1986, at 7-8,
C/M/196 (April 2, 1986) (announcing the limited mandate of the panel
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settlement did result in a legal ruling on the substance of the claim.
Thus, for example, the first complaint by Nicaragua resulted in a
panel ruling in its favor, according to which the U.S. had violated
the relevant GATT provision.58 The panel report was even adopted
by the Council. 59 Most states speaking in the Council expressed
the view that unilateral use of trade restrictions for political ends
was improper, a position that also had been reflected in a
Ministerial Declaration.60 The second claim was also accepted by
the GATT panel established to hear the dispute.61 However, at the
insistence of the United States, the panel was precluded from
considering the validity of the U.S. Article XXI defense.
62
Thus, the GATT Council's unwillingness (or inability) to take
sides in a political dispute unrelated to its trade mandate does not
usually preclude its dispute settlement system from considering
trade sanctions imposed on political grounds and from ruling on
the matter based on the straightforward application of the relevant
GATT provisions invoked. Sometimes, the ruling can even be
adopted in the Council. The rationale is quite simple: a
contracting party imposing trade sanctions on another contracting
party - even for political reasons - is not fulfilling its part in the
reciprocal trade deal between the two countries, and must be
prepared to suffer retaliation by the affected party. In today's
WTO system of binding dispute settlement, trade sanctions by one
established to examine the trade issues between Nicaragua and the United States).
Nicaragua's attempt to get the Council to adopt the panel ruling together with
additional declarations by the Council in its favor also failed (GATr Council,
United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Communication from Nicaragua,
C/W/524 July 14, 1987).
58 Report of the Panel, United States- Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, L/5607
(March 13, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.), at 67-74 (1984).
59 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 13
March 1984, at 7-11, C/M/176 (Apr. 10, 1984). The U.S. did not try to block this
decision. Id. at 8.
60 See discussion supra note 45.
61 Report of the Panel, United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua
L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986). The United States was willing to have the report adopted,
but only as it was, without any additions by the Council disapproving of the
United States' actions and suggesting compensation. Since Nicaragua insisted on
such additions, the impasse was never resolved and the report remained
unadopted.
62 Id.; see also HUDEC, supra note 45, at 528 (noting that the Council did not
pass any ruling as a result of the United States' insistence on adopting the panel
report as it had been written, and, by its very terms of reference, did not include
any questioning of Article XXI justification).
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member state against another-even if politically motivated-
would thus be fearlessly analyzed from a purely legal perspective
by a panel and the Appellate Body; if found incompatible with
WTO rules, such sanctions would be ordered to be repealed. In
case of non-compliance, the harmed state would be authorized to
retaliate. It is true that sometimes the retaliation is not as effective
as the sanctions as a result of an asymmetry in economic power
(such as in the case of the United States and Nicaragua), but that is
an inherent problem of the GATT/WTO enforcement system, and
not peculiar to these types of cases.
Likewise, interviews with veteran officials of the GATT and the
WTO, as well as with diplomats who served there as members of
various delegations, all confirm that the atmosphere was always
very professional and business-oriented, and that there was a
general consensus that non-trade politics should be kept out of the
organization. Certain things "were simply not done" on Rue de
Lausanne 154, even if they were done elsewhere in Geneva. The
GATT contracting parties (and later WTO member states) needed
the organization to work, and could not afford to "rock the boat"
by introducing politically controversial issues into the discussions.
They had ample opportunity to do so elsewhere, in Geneva or in
New York. The GATT/ WTO was simply not the place for it.
4. REASONS FOR THE ABSENCE OF POLITICIZATION WITHIN THE
GATT/WTO
What, then, could the reasons be for this relative lack of
politicization within the GATT/WTO in contrast to other IGOs?
Several explanations can be offered:
4.1. Membership
The record shows that most of the politicization of the IG~s in
the seventies and eighties was a result of the Cold War and of the
Middle East conflict (in particular after the Yom Kippur War in
1973).63 The initiators were mostly the Soviet bloc countries and
63 See Ghebali, supra note 9, at 324-328 (noting that since the 1973 war, Israel
became the major scapegoat in resolutions passed by the various IGOs, and
describing the Cold War background to many of the other manifestations of
politicization); UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
supra note 8 (noting that politicization in UNESCO was connected to the Cold War
and the Middle East conflict); see also Klaus Htifner & Jens Naumann, Unesco:
Only the Crisis of a "Politicized" UN Specialized Agency?, 30 COMP. EDU. REV.
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the Arab states, respectively. Unlike other IGOs, the GATT
remained outside the reach of those countries because most them
were not members.64 The Soviet bloc countries, with their centrally
planned non-market economies, were precluded from joining and
were ideologically opposed to the liberal goals of the GATT. As an
alternative to the GATT, they established their own economic
organization- the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
("CMEA") - at the same time that the GATT was established.65 As
for the Arab states, with the exception of Egypt, as discussed
above, very few joined the GATT.66 Thus, the lack of politicization
can be explained by the fact that the potential initiators of
politicization (due to their political conflicts with GATT members)
were simply absent from the organization during most of the
problematic years. While lately more Arab states have been
joining, they are usually the more politically moderate members of
the Arab League and are less likely to instigate political conflict
within the GATT.67
120, 120-21 (1986) (positing that "the present trend in UNESCO and other parts of
the UN system is becoming ominously reminiscent of the tragic collapse of the
League of Nations"); Hans N. Weiler, Withdrawing from UNESCO: A Decision in
Search of an Argument, 30 COMP. EDU. REV. 132, 132-33 (1986) (recalling that the
debate over the United States' withdrawal from UNESCO was focused on, among
other things, the group's undue politicization).
64 There are exceptions to this rule. Cuba was an original signatory of the
GATT in 1948, prior to its communist revolution in 1959. Czechoslovakia was
also an original signatory, while Yugoslavia acceded in 1966, Poland in 1967,
Romania in 1971, and Hungary in 1973.
65 The organization was established in 1949 by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In 1950, Albania and East
Germany joined. Mongolia joined in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978.
See IVAN SzAsz, THE CMEA UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 33 (2d ed.
1985) (tracing traditional forms of trade between countries and changes
introduced by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA") in the
1970s).
66 Lebanon and Syria were originally parties to the GATT by signing the
Protocol of Provisional Application on July 30, 1948. However, both notified the
Secretary-General of their withdrawal shortly thereafter: Lebanon on December
27, 1950, and Syria on June 7, 1951. See GATT pmbl. Kuwait became a contracting
party as early as 1961 by succession (after having been part of the British
Commonwealth), but as a small country did not keep a permanent mission to the
GATT and was usually not very active in the discussions. Morocco acceded to the
GATT only in 1987, and Tunisia in 1990. Bahrain succeeded in 1971, but only
acceded in December 1993. Id.
67 In addition to the five Arab member states mentioned supra note 66,
including Egypt, four additional states have joined the WTO since its
establishment: Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Another
eight have submitted requests for accession and are in various stages of the
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4.2. Technocrats' Domain
The GATT was traditionally the domain not of the Foreign
Ministries- and certainly not of the Prime Ministers' or Presidents'
offices-but of the technocrats of the Trade Ministries and the
Treasuries. This type of diplomacy was considered "second-class,"
not worthy enough for high-level Foreign Ministry diplomats, and
considered "low politics" as compared with "high politics" that
dealt with security and "real" foreign policy. It was relatively
ignored by the media, which also allowed a quiet and
professionally oriented business environment. As noted by Weiler:
The GATT successfully managed a relative insulation from
the "outside" world of international relations and
established among its practitioners a closely knit
environment revolving round a certain set of shared
normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional
(and personal) ambitions situated in a matrix of long-term
first-name contacts and friendly personal relationships.
GATT operatives became a classical "network." 68
4.3. Members' Vested Interest in the Proper Functioning of the System
The GATT/WTO regime serves the essential interests of its
member states. It is not just an organization that serves as a forum
for discussion, exchange of ideas, or formulation of
recommendations and declaratory resolutions, as do some of the
other IGOs previously discussed. It is an organization in charge of
binding agreements, with the means to ensure the enforcement of
their provisions. The negotiations under the GATT's auspices are
geared to producing more binding obligations and stronger
enforcement measures. Such obligations are aimed at bringing
down trade barriers, opening up more export markets for each
country's industries, and raising the standards of living all over the
world. Thus, the well-being and prosperity of national economies
process: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen.
That may very well change the situation, as may be indicated from the current
crisis around the observer status of the Arab League. See also infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
68 J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the
Internal and External Legitimacy of VVTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191,
194-95 (2001).
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depend on the proper functioning of the GATT regime. Its
breakdown has the potential of harming the global economy, as
well as that of each and every member of the organization.
Countries that do not share this understanding would not have
joined the organization in the first place, considering all the
burdensome obligations connected with such membership. The
members therefore have a vested interest in the proper functioning
of the system. They cannot afford to let it be sacrificed on the altar
of some dubious political achievement, in the form of a declaratory
resolution or condemnation that can just as well be obtained in the
UN General Assembly or another international forum that is less
vital for their economic well-being and perhaps more politically
visible than the GATT/WTO.
4.4. Narrowly Defined Mandate
In contrast to the ambitious and vague mandate of some of the
other IGOs, such as UNESCO,69 GATT had a relatively precise and
limited mandate, confined to the field of trade policy and trade
liberalization. The GATT originally gave much deference to the
domestic socioeconomic policies of its member states, and as long
as these policies were applied non-discriminatorily, in accordance
with the two principles of National Treatment and MFN,70 the
GATT would not interfere.71 The organization thus managed to
stay out of potential controversies connected to the diverging
socioeconomic ideologies of its members. Also, the precisely
defined mandate of the organization does not lend itself easily to
69 The preamble of the UNESCO Charter of National Commissions provides
that the goals of the organization, established in 1946, are "to contribute to peace
and security in the world by promoting collaboration among nations through
education, science, culture and communication in order to further universal
respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental
freedoms." Charter of National Commissions for UNESCO, UNESCO 20th
General Conference Res. 7/42, pmbl. 4 (1978), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/011/001140/114032E.pdf. This vague and
overly broad mandate has also contributed to the introduction of political and
ideological controversy into UNESCO, leading to its politicization. See UNITED
NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 8
("Paradoxically, the very mandate to build. 'defenses of peace' can put an
organization in the front lines of battle, and UNESCO forums have not been
impervious to conflicts raging in the world outside.").
70 GATT arts. I, III.
71 For an exposition of this idea and its gradual erosion, see Arie Reich, The
WTO as a Law Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 321, 325 (2004).
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bring under its auspices issues connected to major political
conflicts. Although trade sanctions are among the weapons used
by opponents in such conflicts, the GATT contained appropriate
escape clauses in order to dodge such political dynamite. In
particular, the GATT includes: the non-application clause, Article
XXXV, which allows a contracting party to refuse to apply the
obligations under the agreement toward a certain state if it declares
so at the time it becomes a contracting party;72 and the security
exceptions clause, Article XXI, which effectively defers to a
country's own judgment of what is necessary in order to protect its
essential security interests, as well as to mandatory decisions of the
Security Council, when such are taken.73 All this is also likely to
have contributed to the GATT/WTO regime's success in keeping
72 Article XXXV:1 of the GATT provides:
This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not
apply as between any contracting party and any other contracting party
if: (a) the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff
negotiations with each other, and (b) either of the contracting parties, at
the time either becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such
application.
According to GATT practice, a country must invoke this provision and notify the
GATT Secretariat. The corresponding provision in the WTO Agreement is Article
XIII. Indeed, when Egypt was in the process of acceding to the GATT, and in
response to questions about its adherence to the Arab boycott, discussed infra note
81 and accompanying text, Egypt referred to its right to invoke Article XXXV.
Egypt invoked it in 1970, at its accession, and withdrew the invocation in 1980,
following the peace agreement with Israel. Morocco and Tunisia invoked Article
XXXV with respect to Israel in 1987. World Trade Organization, Article XXVIII:
Modification of Schedules, in ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE,
VOLUME 2, ARTICLES XXII-XXXVIII, at 959 (6th ed. 1995). Interestingly, Israel has
not invoked this provision against any country, including those three Arab states,
even though Israeli law prohibits imports from countries that prohibit Israeli
exports. The United States invoked Article XXXV in the beginning of the
seventies against Hungary and Romania.
73 Article XXI(c) provides a general exception whenever a contracting party
must take an action "in pursuance of its obligations under the UN Charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security." GATT art. XXI(c). It should be
noted that only the Security Council can impose binding obligations in this field.
Given the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, it is rare
that trade embargoes are imposed by this body. Thus, the GATT Analytical Index
contains no reference whatsoever to Article XXI(c). Id. But see JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAT 748 (1969) (asking whether perhaps the
provision contemplates other measures with less legal force, such as
recommendations of the UN General Assembly). As for the extent of the
deference to each member state's judgment of what is necessary to protect its
essential security interests, this question has been discussed somewhat among
commentators and member states' delegates, but there is no clear answer.
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itself outside the great political conflicts.
4.5. Decisionmaking by Consensus
In the GATT and the WTO, decisions have almost always been
made by consensus.74 Although the WTO Agreement provides for
the possibility of majority voting and for specific majority
requirements in certain situations,75 these provisions have almost
never been utilized. The practice of consensus decisionmaking has
been the norm, both in the WTO and in GATT.76 It would seem
that this practice has also contributed to a more pragmatic,
functional system. It requires the chairman of any GATT/WTO
forum to make sure that there is a consensus among members
before bringing a resolution. Politically controversial resolutions
are automatically shelved and only those that can be agreed upon
by everybody- sometimes only after lengthy behind-the-scenes
negotiations -are passed. This has, of course, contributed to the
legitimacy of decisions adopted and to the constitutional stability
of the organization. It also has prevented attempts, at least until
now, by the growing number of developing countries in the
organization to take advantage of their majority in order to pass
one-sided resolutions, as has happened in other IGOs where
majority voting is used. In practice, the consensus rule within the
GATT/WTO regime has been more than a procedure; it has been
an entrenched convention governing how to behave and what
issues should and should not be raised. Departures from this
convention are frowned upon and may entail costs for the
74 BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 54, at 21.
75 Article IX, paragraph 1 of the WTO Agreement provides:
The WTO shall continue the practice of decisionmaking by consensus
followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be
decided by voting.... Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless
otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral
Trade Agreement.
See also WTO Agreement art. VII, para. 3 (describing the majority vote necessary
for adoption of financial regulations and the annual budget estimate); id. art. X
(outlining the majority votes and procedures needed for amendments to the
Agreement); id. art. XII (stating the majority vote provisions in place for decisions
on accession).
76 Under GATT 1947 there has not been a vote on a policy matter (other than
waivers and terms of accession) since 1959 (BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 54, at
21).
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infringer.
5. IS THERE A POTENTIAL THREAT OF POLITICIZATION OF THE WTO?
Having identified several explanations for the lack of
politicization within the GATT/WTO until now, we can now
tackle the question of whether there is currently a potential threat
of politicization of the WTO. This will be done by considering the
question of whether any of the circumstances described in the
explanations given above have changed or are likely to change in
the near future.
5.1. "Membership"
The membership of the WTO is on a steady rise. From a small,
intimate organization of some 23 original GATT-contracting
parties, the WTO has emerged as an organization with an almost
all-encompassing membership (150 at the present). This naturally
confronts the organization with greater diversity, a higher chance
of disagreement and controversy, and greater difficulties in
managing its decisionmaking process. On the other hand, while
most formerly communist countries have by now joined the WTO
(including China, which still has a communist regime) or are in the
process of joining, the Cold War is over and most of them no
longer espouse the same ideologies which in the past nurtured the
political conflict with the West. However, the conflict in the
Middle East is still unfortunately far from over, and the number of
Arab states joining the WTO is on the rise. In addition to Egypt,
now Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and
the United Arab Emirate are members. Eight more countries,
namely Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
and Yemen have applied for membership and are in the midst of
accession negotiations. One of the obstacles connected with this
accession of the above-mentioned countries is their de facto
continued espousal of the Arab boycott.77 Unless they are willing
to give up this boycott, in particular the secondary and tertiary
ones, 78 the political conflict will loom in the background until it
77 See Tomer Broude, Accession to the WTO: Current Issues in the Arab World,
32 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 154-159 (1998) (discussing the legal issues involved with
the accession of various Arab nations to the WTO); Kontorovitch, supra note 32, at
283 (discussing the application of GATT to trade restrictions imposed solely on
the basis of foreign policy).
78 A secondary boycott imposes trade restrictions on nations or firms that
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breaks onto the main stage of the WTO deliberations.
As these lines are written, there is renewed hope for a possible
reinstitution of the peace process in the Middle East. If this hope is
realized and the century-old conflict resolved, the accession of
more Arab states to the WTO may be less likely to create a risk of
politicization of the WTO. However, if the peace process does not
continue and hostilities break out again, experience shows that
certain recurring patterns of group dynamics among the Arab
states within international forums lead to radicalization and
eventually mobilization of the IGO to serve as a tool in the political
struggle.79 Also, the possible accession of Iran 80 (and even, to a
certain extent, the accession of Saudi Arabia and Libya) may have
the potential of introducing the larger conflict between
fundamentalist Islam and the Christian West into the WTO. The
fear of such developments has probably been the motivation for
the U.S. decision to block the application of the Arab League,
which is an entirely political organization with no real trade
mandate except for initiating and enforcing the Arab boycott,81 for
WTO observer status. As a result, the Arab member states have
retaliated by blocking the granting of observer status to any new
trade with the nation subject to the primary boycott. A tertiary boycott goes even
further by imposing such restrictions on those who trade with those who trade
with the originally boycotted nation. See Raj Bhala, National Security and
International Trade Law: Mhat the GATT Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 284 (1998) (defining both primary and secondary boycotts
in analyzing U.S. sanctions with regard to Iran and Libya).
79 A Swedish colleague I met at a conference in Brussels in November 2004
told me about a UN conference he had attended devoted to the problems of
disabled persons. To his dismay, the conference had been hijacked by the
Palestinian delegation, which managed to divert most of the discussions to the
"suffering inflicted on the Palestinian handicapped by the Israeli occupation." As
a result of the energy spent on this topic and of the controversy stirred, he felt that
many of the real objectives of the conference had been neglected.
80 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
81 While the 1945 Charter of the Arab League admittedly included in its
broadly-worded mandate "economic and financial affairs, including commercial
relations," in practice the League has had no significant activity in this field and
none of its many committees, subsidiary bodies, or specialized organizations are
devoted to trade or commercial relations (except for its "Special Bureau for
Boycotting Israel"). Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S.
248; see also Ed Haynes Arab League General Information,
http://faculty.winthrop.edu/haynese/mlas/all.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2005)
(providing the text of the 1945 Charter as well as a complete list of the various
committees and general information about the League).
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IGO.82 This current situation, whereby all IGOs-including some
whose presence as observers in the discussions is important for the
work of the WTO-are blocked from receiving observer status is
intolerable and is in itself a manifestation of an evolving
politicization of the WTO and of the harm such politicization can
cause to the proper functioning of the organization. In an extreme
situation of confrontation, with its current image among certain
circles as the spearhead of Western capitalist imperialism, the
WTO may at some point in the future become a fit arena for a
political clash of civilizations, somewhat reminiscent of
Huntington's predictions.
83
Another source of politicization within the WTO which has
already materialized is the conflict between China and Taiwan.
The People's Republic of China insists on viewing Taiwan as a
renegade province ever since the communists drove the
nationalists off the Chinese mainland in 1949, and has
subsequently blocked Taiwan's accession to most of the IGOs.
Taiwan's accession to the WTO was made possible only after
China acceded, and even then not as an independent state, but as
"the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
82 See Observership, Market Access Stall at TNC, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS
DIG. (Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. Geneva, Switz.), May 2, 2002, at 1,
4-5, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-05-02/2002BRIDGESWeekly16.pdf
(commenting on the ongoing political disagreements over whether the Arab
League should gain trade body observership status); Small Economies'
Characteristics, Problems and Solutions Examined, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.
(Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. Geneva, Switz.), Feb. 23, 2005, at 1,
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-02-23/BRIDGESWeekly9-6.pdf (discussing the
consideration of requests for observer status by the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States and the Arab League); see also Middle East Conflict Spills Over Into
WTO Negotiations, WASHINGTON TARIFFS & TRADE LETrER, Apr. 22, 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.wttlonline.com/2002/22-16.html ("[t]he bitter Israeli-
Arab conflict has reached into the World Trade Organization (WTO) where Israel
and the U.S. have blocked the effort of Middle Eastern countries to give the Arab
League observer status in Doha Round negotiations."). In response, Arab states
led by Egypt have retaliated by blocking a similar application of the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States as well as all other IGOs. Several Arab Members
demanded that the two applications be considered simultaneously. Id. The fact
that the Arab League is primarily a political organization with no specific trade
mandate (except for initiating and supervising the Arab boycott against Israel, a
WTO member state), unlike the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, has not
prevented these Arab members from insisting on granting the League observer
status within the WTO.
83 Huntington predicts a clash of Western civilization -North America and
Europe-with a coalition of Islamic and Far Eastern states. SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 20-21(1996).
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Matsu," utilizing the idea that the WTO doesn't require its
members to be sovereign states as long as they have full autonomy
in the conduct of their external commercial relations (such as the
setting of tariffs and other policies on imports),84 Nevertheless, the
relations between the two members within the WTO have been far
from idyllic in the few years that have passed since their accession,
and lately their political conflict has had negative spillover effects
on the functioning of the organization. Thus, for over two years,
China has blocked the publication of a new updated WTO
Directory (the "Blue Book"85) because of its opposition to the listing
of Taiwan's delegation as a "Permanent Mission" (as it appears in
the 2002 edition of the WTO Directory), and insists on the term
"Trade Office," similar to the term used in relation to the Hong
Kong and Macau delegations. Taiwan opposes this change;
therefore the required consensus decision could not be reached and
the new directory could not be published.8 6 Furthermore, Taiwan's
accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement ("AGP")
is being blocked by China (even though China itself is not a
member of this plurilateral agreement) because of similar political-
symbolic reasons: under the AGP, each party is required to specify
in an appendix to the Agreement the government entities it has
agreed to subject to the rules of the Agreement. 7 Taiwan's
84 See WTO Agreement art. XII, para. 1 (stating that entities lacking full
sovereignty only need full control of their external commercial dealings to qualify
for WTO membership).
85 The Blue Book is the directory of the various WTO units and their
telephone numbers, as well as the addresses and contact details of all the Member
States' delegations. It is an internal publication that is only distributed within the
organization, to the diplomatic missions, and to other IGOs. The last version was
published in October 2002 and is in urgent need of updating as a result of
accessions of new members and many changes of addresses.
86 The standoff was finally resolved in June 2005 with the publication of a
new directory. The new directory maintained the term "Permanent Mission" in
relation to Taiwan's delegation, but dropped the original titles addressing Taiwan
officials as "Counselor," "First Secretary," and "Second Secretary." They were
instead listed as "Mr.," "Miss," and "Mrs." Only the titles of the permanent
representative and his deputy were maintained. The Taiwan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced that it would file a formal complaint with the WTO Secretariat
in this matter, although in Taiwan the opposition claimed that this had been done
with the consent of the Taiwanese delegation, perhaps as part of a compromise
with the People's Republic of China. Joy Wan, Taiwan Lodges Complaint over WNTO
Directory, TAIWAN NEWs, June 29, 2005, available at
http://www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/Politics/2005/06/29/1120009056.htm.
87 See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Established the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), art. I, para. 1,
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proposed list, like that of most other parties, contains most of its
central government ministries, including the Prime Minister's
Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China refuses to have
such a list of entities in the AGP on the grounds that a province of
China cannot have a Prime Minister or a Foreign Ministry. It has
urged Taiwan to change the name of these and other entities so as
to conceal any indications of sovereignty. Taiwan refuses to do so,
pointing also to the impossibility of calling government entities
(that need to be identified and contacted by potential bidders) by
false names. Consequently, and until this political dispute is
resolved, Taiwan is being blocked from joining the AGP, the
procurement of its government entities cannot be opened up to
international competition, and its industry is precluded from
competing on an equal basis for the procurement contracts of
foreign governments.
Finally, the risk of politicization may originate from other
states which cannot be identified at this time. We cannot foresee
the political conflicts of the future, whether they will be regional or
"clashes of civilizations." But, whatever they will be, as the
number of members increases the chance that the countries in
conflict will all be WTO members increases correspondingly. The
possibility always exists that one of the conflicting parties will try
to introduce the conflict into the WTO in order to use the
organization in its political battle.
5.2. "Technocrats' Domain"
The public profile of the WTO has gone through significant
changes over the last decade. Ever since the "Battle in Seattle" and
the emergence of the Anti-Globalization movement, the WTO is no
longer a boring technical subject ignored by journalists and
statesmen alike.88 As noted by to the Consultative Board to
Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
(describing the various entities covered by this agreement in regard to the
application of laws, regulations, procedures, or practices). The government
entities are divided into three annexes: Annex 1 (containing central government
entities), Annex 2 (containing sub-central entities), and Annex 3 (containing all
other entities that a Party has agreed to make subject to the rules of Agreement on
Government Procurement). Id.
88 In his speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on the tenth
anniversary of the WTO, the WTO Director General, Supachai Panitchpakdi,
expressed his amazement "that an organization which spends the vast majority of
its time deciding matters of a supremely arcane nature has attracted so much
media attention and controversy." Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General,
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Director General Panitchpakdi, the issues dealt with by the WTO
"increasingly touch on sensitive aspects of domestic policy-making
and crucial choices among welfare objectives."8 9 Thus, in many
countries international trade policy has become part of the political
agenda and national election campaigns. This naturally introduces
a higher degree of controversy into the dealings of the WTO, and
may lead to polarization and breakdown. The collapse of the
Cancin Ministerial in 2003 is a case in point. Of course,
controversy in itself is not equivalent to politicization, as long as
the controversy is within the realms of trade policy and the
legitimate scope of the WTO's mandate. However, high-level
controversy and sharp conflict create a more prominent public
profile, which in turn may invite abuse for political ends. If you
build a world stage, you must expect it to be used by the world's
actors. Also, high-level controversy can easily deteriorate into a
political conflict between states, which may lead to the
introduction of political considerations into WTO decisions and
politicization of the entire organization. Finally, the importance of
trade and economic relations in today's world may tempt countries
to use international trade policy as a tool in their foreign policy,
and subject the former to the latter.
A prominent example of this is the United States' policy toward
Iran's accession bid. Iran first applied for membership in the WTO
in 1996, but its request has been blocked by the United States ever
since.90 The United States' motives have been mainly political and
part of a U.S. trade boycott of Iran since the Khomeini revolution in
the early eighties. However, the U.S. block may also be partly
motivated by the concern that Iran's accession might introduce
Islamic fundamentalist politics into the WTO. Recently, the U.S.
decided to change its policy and to "drop its longstanding
opposition to Iran's membership in the WTO if Iran renounced its
WTO, The WTO after 10 Years: The Lessons Learned and the Challenges Ahead,
Speech, (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spsp-e/
spsp35_e.htm.
89 World Trade Organization, Consultative Board to Director-General
Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges
in the New Millennium 62 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter The Future of the WTOI available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/10anniv-e/future-wto-e.pdf.
90 See U.S. Shifts Policy On Iran Accession, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.
(Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), Mar. 16, 2005, at 9,
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-16/BRIDGESWeekly9-9.pdf.
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nuclear ambitions."91 In a statement made on March 11, 2005, "the
Bush administration announced that the U.S. would join the EU in
offering [Iran] economic incentives, including WTO membership, if
it agreed to permanently stop its production of enriched
uranium." 92 This announcement, with its express linkage between
WTO membership and Iran's nuclear policies, may mark the end of
the traditional separation between the WTO and "high politics."
The same applies to U.S. policy in relation to Libya's accession
request. U.S. trade officials have confirmed that their decision to
withdraw their longstanding objection to Libya's WTO
membership is part of "a larger U.S. policy with regard to Libya,"
and is connected to Libya's decision last year to renounce its
weapons of mass destruction programs and to allow international
inspectors entry into Libya.93 Indeed, it seems that ever since
September 11th, the United States has viewed its trade policy as an
important dimension of its overall foreign policy.
94
5.3. "Narrowly Defined Mandate"
Ever since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the mandate
of the WTO has not been as narrow as it once was. The policy of
not interfering with the domestic policies of its members is not
entirely applicable anymore since the introduction of several
harmonization measures. 95 Issues such as environmental policies,
protection of intellectual property (including sensitive areas such
as health and agriculture), public services, public procurement,
subsidization of domestic activities, and sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, to name just a few, have become part and
parcel of the WTO's mandate, as well as sources of contention and
controversy. This too raises the political profile of the organization
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 WTO, U.S. Approve Libya Request to Begin Accession Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
July 30, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 82164.
94 One indication of this change was the recent transfer of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Robert B. Zoelick, to the post of Deputy Secretary of State on
February 16, 2005. See U.S. Department of State, Biography: Robert B. Zoelick,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/42449.htm (last visited Dec. 4 2005). This
move may signify that the U.S. administration views international trade policy as
part of, and subject to, its general foreign policy.
95 See Reich, supra note 71, at 329-40 (providing a more detailed discussion of
the different domestic policy areas of its member states that the GATT/WTO
regime is now actively working to harmonize).
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and takes it out of the exclusive domain of the technocrats. This
may in turn deteriorate into politicization if the political
circumstances are right.
5.4. "Decisionmaking by Consensus"
Even though decisionmaking by consensus is deeply rooted in
GATT/WTO practice, lately there have been demands from
various directions to change this tradition. A coalition of civil
society NGOs and developing countries seems to be emerging,
calling for "democratization" of the WTO. For some coalition
members, this means switching to majority voting, a device used
by many other international organizations, which naturally would
give developing countries greater control over the decisionmaking
process. A proposal currently enjoying broad support from
different sectors, mainly of civil society, is that of reforming the
UN Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") into an Economic,
Social, and Environmental Security Council with effective
authority over UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, and
the WTO.96 This would in effect eliminate the independence of the
WTO and subject it to a much more political organ with a wider
mandate in which majority voting is practiced. The Consultative
Board appointed by the WTO Secretary-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi has also recommended reconsideration of the
consensus principle- albeit in a much more modest proposal-
with a view to perhaps limit its use to substantive issues, and put
other procedural reins on it.97 As more developing countries
become WTO members, pressure to abandon the consensus system
will increase. Developed countries, the United States in particular,
are of course very unlikely to agree to such a change; therefore it
cannot be expected to occur in the near future, except perhaps for
96 This proposal was espoused by a declaration signed in London on April 1,
2004 called "Reforms of the System of International Institutions to Make Another
World Possible," as part of the "World Campaign for In-Depth Reform of the
System of International Institutions." SEMINAR ON FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR REFORM
OF THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, REPORT app. at 8 (2004), available at
http://www.reformcampaign.net/documents/memo-escenaris.pdf. The London
Declaration was signed by a large number of nongovernmental organizations,
including the World Forum of Civil Society Networks, and prominent former
leaders, such as Butros Butros Ghali and Javier Perez de Cuellar (both former UN
Secretary-Generals), Federico Mayor (former UNESCO Secretary-General), and
Mario Soares (former Prime Minister of Spain). Id.
97 The Future of the WTO, supra note 89, at 63-65.
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minor, less critical issues. However, the mere existence of this
pressure is likely to fuel controversy and geopolitical tension
within the organization, with both sides using-and abusing-the
consensus system in order to exert pressure. Eventually some type
of compromise may have to be reached, and the WTO may find
itself without one of its depoliticizing mechanisms.
The only factor, out of the five enumerated above, that is not
likely to change in the near future is the member states' vested
interest in the proper functioning of the system. In fact, as the
WTO regime grows, their interest in a well-functioning system will
increase correspondingly. This interest will therefore serve as a
counterbalance to other potential causes of politicization. Whether
this will suffice to prevent politicization, only the future can tell.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article has documented and analyzed an important
feature of the GATT/WTO that has almost gone unnoticed in the
academic literature: its relatively unpoliticized character. It has
shown how unlike many of the other so-called specialized agencies
of the UN, for whom the fallout of the major geopolitical conflicts
of our time has caused some serious organizational dysfunctions,
the GATT/WTO has hitherto largely managed to distance itself
from these conflicts and thus been able to better serve its
objectives. By relating the notion of "politicization" to the theory
of Functionalism, one of the most central theories of international
organizations, this Article has developed a definition of this notion
that is theoretically defendable and legally workable.
This Article has suggested several explanations for the relative
absence of politicization in the GATT. These include its historically
limited membership of like-minded states, which certainly helped
create a business-minded tradition of technocrats devoted to
promoting the economies of their countries, the GATT's narrowly
defined mandate, and its system of decisionmaking by consensus.
Legal safety valves such as the non-application clause and the
security exceptions provision, as well as the GATT/WTO's
traditional deference to the domestic socioeconomic policies of its
member states, contribute to the regime's success in keeping itself
outside the great political conflicts.
Based on these explanations, the last section of this Article tried
to assess the risk of future politicization of the WTO and the
sources of this risk. It showed that many of the characteristics that
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in the past protected the GATT from politicization are not present
anymore in today's WTO. The WTO's growing membership,
broadened mandate in sensitive areas, and rising public profile are
all likely to increase the threat of politicization, as are the recent
calls, both from within and without the organization, for a revision
of the consensus rule. Indeed, there are already worrying signs of
politicization within the WTO that are discussed in this last section.
While to date these have not been major impediments to the work
of the WTO, if the situation continues to deteriorate we may be
faced with some major organizational dysfunctions in the future.
What then can be done to counter the threat of politicization of
the WTO? To start with, heightened awareness of the increased
threat among WTO member states and functionaries could
contribute to greater caution and restraint in their dealings within
the organization. Member states must bear in mind that their
short-term political gains may be outweighed by their long-term
economic losses resulting from the WTO's organizational paralysis.
There may also be a need to rethink overly ambitious plans for
further broadening of the WTO mandate-in particular if such
expansion will encompass politically sensitive areas. The
institutions in charge of interpreting the WTO agreements (i.e., the
panels, the Appellate Body, and the General Council itself
9 8 ) must
also be careful not to create problematic doctrines or exceptions
that will require the WTO judicial organs to get involved in
politically sensitive controversies. For instance, a broad
interpretation of the public morals exception in the first paragraph
of Article XX may create an overly wide exception that will require
WTO panels to rule on politically controversial issues, thus
undermining their legitimacy and stirring up more conflict.99
Finally, in considering institutional reform, member states should
think twice before abandoning the consensus principle, or even
limiting it to certain instances, as has been proposed. While it may
be utterly burdensome at times, the consensus principle has many
98 See WTO Agreement art. IX, para. 2 ("The Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this
Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.").
99 For a debate on this issue, compare Werner Meng, International Labor
Standards and International Trade Law, in THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 371, 388-89 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2004) with
Arie Reich, Core Labor Standards and the WTO: Beware of Unilateralism! -A Response
to Werner Meng, in THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra at 395, 402-04.
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advantages including installing a spirit of cooperation and
avoiding political controversies that may undermine the WTO's
ability to function properly.
As noted above, politicization within the WTO can also be
defined legally. This raises the possibility of analyzing it as an
illegal phenomenon. Legal measures may also provide an option
for dealing with politicization, but this is a complex issue that
merits separate discussion. In fact, the entire issue of politicization
of international organizations merits further discussion, and this
Article should be seen as an invitation for further research on this
subject, both in relation to the WTO as well as other functional
IGOs.
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